We propose a privacy-preserving support vector machine (SVM) classifier for a data matrix A whose input feature columns as well as individual data point rows are divided into groups belonging to different entities. Each entity is unwilling to make public its group of columns and rows. Our classifier utilizes the entire data matrix A while maintaining the privacy of each block. This classifier is based on the concept of a random kernel K(A, B ′ ) where B ′ is the transpose of a random matrix B, as well as the reduction of a possibly complex pattern of data held by each entity into a checkerboard pattern. The proposed nonlinear SVM classifier, which is public but does not reveal any of the privately-held data, has accuracy comparable to that of an ordinary SVM classifier based on the entire set of input features and data points all made public.
INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been wide interest in privacy-preserving support vector machine (SVM) classification. Basically the problem revolves around generating a classifier based on data, parts of which are held by private entities who, for various reasons, are unwilling to make it public. When each entity holds its own group of input feature values for all individuals while other entities hold other groups of feature values for the same individuals, the data is referred to as vertically partitioned. This is so because feature values are represented by columns of a data matrix while individuals are represented by rows of the data matrix. In [22] , privacypreserving SVM classifiers were obtained for vertically partitioned data by adding random perturbations to the data. In [20, 21] , horizontally partitioned privacy-preserving SVMs and induction tree classifiers were obtained for data where different entities hold the same input features for different groups of individuals. Other privacy preserving classifying techniques include cryptographically private SVMs [16] , wavelet-based distortion [10] and rotation perturbation [2] . More recently [14, 13] a random kernel K(A, B ′ ) where B ′ is the transpose of a random matrix B was used to handle vertically partitioned data [14] as well as horizontally partitioned data [13] .
In this work we propose a highly efficient privacy-preserving SVM (PPSVM) classifier for vertically and horizontally partitioned data that employs a random kernel K(A, B ′ ). Thus the m × n data matrix A with n features and m data points, each of which in R n , is partitioned in a possibly complex way among p entities as depicted, for example, among p = 4 entities as shown in Figure 1 . Our task is to construct an SVM classifier based on the entire data matrix A without requiring the contents of each entity's matrix block be made public.
Our approach will be to first subdivide a given data matrix A that is owned by p entities into a checkerboard pattern of q cells, with q ≥ p, as depicted, for example in Figure 2 . Secondly, each cell block A i j of the checkerboard will be utilized to generate the random kernel block K(A i j , B · j ′ ), where B · j is random matrix of appropriate dimension. It will be shown in Section 2 that under mild assumptions, the random kernel K(A i j , B · j ′ ) will safely protect the data block A i j from discovery by entities that do not own it, while allowing the computation of a classifier based on the entire data matrix A. We now briefly describe the contents of the paper. In Section 2 we present our method for a privacy-protecting linear SVM classifier for checkerboard partitioned data, and in Section 3 do the same for a nonlinear SVM classifier. In Section 4 we give computational results that show the effectiveness of our approach, including correctness that is comparable to ordinary SVMs that use the entire dataset. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary and some ideas for future work.
We describe our notation now. All vectors will be column vectors unless transposed to a row vector by a prime ′ . For a vector x ∈ R n the notation x j will signify either the j-th component or j-th block of components. The scalar (inner) product of two vectors x and y in the n-dimensional real space R n will be denoted by x ′ y. For
The notation A ∈ R m×n will signify a real m × n matrix. For such a matrix, A ′ will denote the transpose of A, A i will denote the i-th row or i-th block of rows of A and A · j the j-th column or the j-th block of columns of A. A vector of ones in a real space of arbitrary dimension will be denoted by e. Thus for e ∈ R m and y ∈ R m the notation e ′ y will denote the sum of the components of y. A vector of zeros in a real space of arbitrary dimension will be denoted by 0. For A ∈ R m×n and B ∈ R k×n , a kernel K(A, B ′ ) maps R m×n × R n×k into R m×k . In particular, if x and y are column vectors in R n then,
The base of the natural logarithm will be denoted by ε. A frequently used kernel in nonlinear classification is the Gaussian kernel [18, 17, 11] 
and µ is a positive constant. We shall not assume that our kernels satisfy Mercer's positive definiteness condition [18, 17, 3] , however we shall assume that they are separable in the following sense:
where the symbol ⊙ denotes the Hadamard component-wise product of two matrices of the same dimensions [5] , E ∈ R m×n 1 , F ∈ R m×n 2 , G ∈ R k×n 1 and H ∈ R k×n 2 . It is straightforward to show that a linear kernel K(A, B ′ ) = AB ′ satisfies (1.1) with the + sign, and a Gaussian kernel satisfies (1.1) with the ⊙ sign. The abbreviation "s.t." stands for "subject to".
Privacy-Preserving Linear Classifier for Checkerboard Partitioned Data
The dataset that we wish to obtain a classifier for consists of m points in R n represented by the m rows of the matrix A ∈ R m×n . The matrix columns of A are partitioned into s vertical blocks of n 1 , n 2 , . . . . . . and n s columns in each block such that n 1 + n 2 + . . . Figure 1 . We note that each cell block of the checkerboard is owned by a separate entity but with the possibility of a single entity owning more than one checkerboard cell. No entity is willing to make its cell block(s) public. Furthermore, each individual row of A is labeled as belonging to the class +1 or −1 by a corresponding diagonal matrix D ∈ R m×m of ±1's. The linear kernel classifier to be generated based on all the data will be a separating plane in R n :
which classifies a given point x according to the sign of x ′ w − γ. Here, w = B ′ u, w ∈ R n is the normal to the plane x ′ w − γ = 0, γ ∈ R determines the distance of the plane from the origin in R n and B is a random matrix in R k×n . The change of variables w = B ′ u is employed in order to kernelize the data and is motivated by the fact that when B = A and hence w = A ′ u, the variable u is the dual variable for a 2-norm SVM [11] . The variables u ∈ R k and γ ∈ R are to be determined by an optimization problem such that the labeled data A satisfy, to the extent possible, the separation condition:
This condition (2.3) places the +1 and −1 points represented by A on opposite sides of the separating plane (2.2). In general, the matrix B which determines a transformation of variables w = B ′ u, is set equal to A. However, in reduced support vector machines [9, 7] B =Ā, whereĀ is a submatrix of A whose rows are a small subset of the rows of A. However, B can be a random matrix in Rm ×n with n ≤m ≤ m if m ≥ n andm = m if m ≤ n. This random choice of B holds the key to our privacy-preserving classifier and has been used effectively in SVM classification problems [12] . Our computational results of Section 4 will show that there is no substantial difference between using a random B or a random submatrix ofĀ of the rows of A as in reduced SVMs [9, 8] . One justification for these similar results can be given for the case whenm ≥ n and the rank of them × n matrix B is n. For such a case, when B is replaced by A in (2.3), this results in a regular linear SVM formulation with a solution, say v ∈ R m . In this case, the reduced SVM formulation (2.3) can match the regular SVM term AA ′ v by the term AB ′ u, since B ′ u = A ′ v has a solution u for any v because B ′ has rank n.
We shall now partition the n columns of the random matrix B ∈ Rm ×n into s column blocks with column block B · j containing n j columns for j = 1, . . . , s. Furthermore, each column block B · j will be generated by entities owning the m−by-n j column block of A · j and is never made public. Thus, we have:
We will show that under the assumption that:
the privacy of each checkerboard block privacy is protected. We are ready to state our algorithm which will provide a linear classifier for the data without revealing privately held checkerboard cell blocks A i j , i = 1, . . . , r, j = 1, . . . , s. The accuracy of this algorithm will, in general, be comparable to that of a linear SVM using a publicly available A instead of merely A ·1 B ·1 ′ , A ·2 B ·2 ′ . . . . . . A ·s B ·s ′ , as will be the case in the following algorithm. 
(IV) A publicly calculated linear classifier x ′ Bu − γ = 0 is computed by some standard method such as 1-norm SVM [11, 1] for some positive parameter ν:
(V) For each new x ∈ R n , the component blocks x j ′ B · j ′ , j = 1, . . . , s, are made public from which a public linear classifier is computed as follows: We turn now to nonlinear classification.
Privacy Preserving Nonlinear Classifier for Checkerboard Partitioned Data
The approach to nonlinear classification is similar to that for the linear one, except that we make use of the Hadamard separability of a nonlinear kernel (1.1) which is satisfied by a Gaussian kernel. Otherwise, the approach is very similar to that of a linear kernel. We state that approach explicitly now. 
(IV) A publicly calculated linear classifier K(x ′ , B ′ )u − γ = 0 is computed by some standard method such as 1-norm SVM [11, 1] for some positive parameter ν:
. , s, are made public from which a public nonlinear classifier is computed as follows:
which classifies the given x according to the sign of K(x ′ , B ′ )u − γ. Before turning to our computational results, it is useful to note that Algorithms 2.1 and 3.1 can be used easily with other kernel classification algorithms instead of the 1-norm SVM, including the ordinary 2-norm SVM [17] , the proximal SVM [4] , and logistic regression [19] .
REMARK 3.2. Note that in the above algorithm no entity i j which owns cell block A i j reveals its dataset nor its components of a new data point x j . This is so because it is impossible to compute the m i n j numbers constituting A i j ∈ R m i ×n j given only the m im numbers constituting K(
We turn now to our computational results.
Computational Results
To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed privacy preserving SVM (PPSVM), we used seven datasets from the UCI Repository [15] to simulate a situation in which data is distributed among several different entities. We formed a checkerboard partition which divided the data into blocks, with each entity owning exactly one block. Each block had data for approximately 25 examples, and we carried out experiments in which there were one, two, four, and eight vertical partitions (for example, the checkerboard pattern in Figure 2 has four vertical partitions). Thus, the blocks in each experiment all contained all, one half, one fourth, or one eighth of the total number of features. With one vertical partition, our approach is the same as the technique for horizontally partitioned data described in [13] , and these results provide a baseline for the experiments with more partitions. We note that the errors with no sharing represent a worst-case scenario in that a different entity owns each block of data. If entities owned multiple blocks, their errors without sharing might decrease. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such entities would generally do better than our PPSVM approach, especially in cases in which the PPSVM is close to the ordinary 1-norm SVM. We compare our PPSVM approach to a situation in which each entity forms a classifier only using its own data, with no sharing, and to a situation in which all entities share the reduced kernel K(A,Ā ′ ) without privacy, whereĀ is a matrix whose rows are a random subset of the rows of A [9] . Results for one, two, four, and eight vertical partitions are reported in Table 1 . All experiments were run using the commonly used Gaussian kernel described in Section 1. In every result,Ā consisted of ten percent of the rows of A randomly selected, while B was a completely random matrix with the same number of columns as A. The number of rows of B was set to the minimum of n − 1 and the number of rows ofĀ, where n is the number of features in the vertical partition. Thus, we ensure that the condition (2.5) discussed in the previous sections holds in order to guarantee that the private data A i j cannot be recovered from K(A i j , B ′ ). Each entry of B was selected independently from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. All datasets were normalized so that each feature was between zero and one. This normalization can be carried out if the entities disclose only the maximum and minimum of each feature in their datasets. When computing ten-fold cross validation, we first divided the data into folds and set up the training and testing sets in the usual way. Then each entity's dataset was formed from the training set of each fold. The accuracies of all classifiers were computed on the testing set of each fold.
To save time, we used the tuning strategy described in [6] to choose the parameters ν of (3.10) and µ of the Gaussian kernel. In this Nested Uniform Design approach, rather than evaluating a classifier at each point of a grid in the parameter space, the classifier is evaluated only at a set of points which is designed to "cover" the original grid to the extent possible. The point from this smaller set on which the classifier does best is then made the center of a grid which covers a smaller range of parameter space, and the process is repeated. Huang et al. [6] demonstrate empirically that this approach finds classifiers with similar misclassification error as a brute-force search through the entire grid. We set the initial range of log 10 ν to [−7, 7] , and the initial range of log 10 µ as described in [6] . Note that we set the initial range of log 10 Table 1 : Comparison of error rates for entities sharing entire data without privacy through the reduced kernel K(A,Ā ′ ), sharing data using our PPSVM approach, and not sharing data. When there are enough features, results are given for situations with one, two, four, and eight vertical partitions using a Gaussian kernel.
each entity using only that entity's examples and features. We used a Uniform Design with thirty runs from http://www.math.hkbu.edu.hk/UniformDesign for both nestings, and used leave-one-out cross validation on the training set to evaluate each (ν, µ) pair when the entities did not share and five-fold cross validation on the training set they did. We used leave-one-out cross validation when not sharing because only about 25 examples were available to each entity in that situation.
To illustrate the improvement in error rate of PPSVM compared to an ordinary 1-norm SVM based only on the data for each entity with no sharing, we provide a graphical presentation of some results in Table 1 . Figure 3 shows a scatterplot comparing the error rates of our data-sharing PPSVM versus the 1-norm no-sharing reduced SVM using Gaussian kernels. The diagonal line in both figures marks equal error rates. Note that points below the diagonal line represent datasets for which PPSVM has a lower error rate than the average error of the entities using only their own data. Figure 3 shows a situation in which there are two vertical partitions of the dataset, while Figure 4 shows a situation in which there are four vertical partitions. Note that in Figure 3 , our PPSVM approach has a lower error rate for six of the seven datasets, while in Figure 4 , PPSVM has a lower error rate on Table 1 corresponding to the letters attached to the point. Table 1 corresponding to the letters attached to the point. Note that there are not enough features in the Bupa Liver dataset for four vertical partitions. all six datasets.
Conclusion and Outlook
We have proposed a linear and nonlinear privacy-preserving SVM classifier for a data matrix, arbitrary blocks of which are held by various entities that are unwilling to make their blocks public. Our approach divides the data matrix into a checkerboard pattern and then creates a linear or nonlinear kernel matrix from each cell block of the checkerboard together with a suitable random matrix that preserves the privacy of the cell block data. Computational comparisons indicate that the accuracy of our proposed approach is comparable to full and reduced data classifiers. Furthermore, a marked improvement of accuracy is obtained by the privacy-preserving SVM compared to classifiers generated by each entity using its own data alone. Hence, by making use of a random kernel for each cell block, the proposed approach succeeds in generating an accurate classifier based on privately held data without revealing any of that data.
Future work will entail combining our approach with other ones such as those of rotation perturbation [2] , cryptographic approach [16] and data distortion [10] .
